Oyer (2007, 2008) considered the turnover of economics professors early in their careers. He found professors are more likely to move down from higher ranked schools than up from lower ranked schools. An asymmetric information model suggests this phenomenon is explained by imperfect screening at one's initial hiring. A smaller fraction of more able individuals and more accurate screening imply a greater chance downward movement exceeds movement up.
Introduction
In recent work, academic economists have examined their own labor market (Oyer 2006 , and 2008 , and Smeets et al. 2006 . In a pair of papers, Oyer (2007 Oyer ( , 2008 considers the turnover of economics professors early in their careers. Specifically, Oyer (2007) considered a sample of 1,263 economics PhDs from seven U.S. universities who went on the job market between 1979 and 1994. He tracked where these individuals were employed 10 years after their initial employment. Among his results is professors are more likely to move down from higher ranked schools than up from lower ranked schools.
One could argue it is easier to move down than up because there are more positions in lower level schools. However, this "demand" argument is not persuasive, as will be seen below. Consider the movement between 1) top 25 schools and other schools, and 2) top 50 schools and other schools. To account for "demand" elsewhere we present the number who moved up or down as a percentage of those initially in the other category.
Using Table 1 in Oyer (2007) , considering top 25 schools and all others (excluding those in the missing category), we find the following. Consider the argument is it easier to move down than up because there are more positions in lower level schools. First, plenty of openings exist at higher level schools; there are at least the ones for individuals who were terminated. Second, if higher level schools choose to hire new PhDs and not those who have been on the faculty at lower level schools, this is evidence lower level schools do not make many mistakes---do not hire many stars. Third, the evidence presented suggests, even accounting for "demand" at different levels, individuals are about twice as likely to move down as they are to move up.
In order to explain the phenomenon of more economics professors moving down than moving up, the next section considers a screening model.
A screening model
In this section, we consider why individuals are more likely to move to lower ranked schools than they are to higher ranked schools. Call higher ranked schools Type One schools, or T1s, and lower ranked schools Type Two schools, or T2s. Denote It is assumed the probability of a favorable signal, given , prob(favorable|), is positively related to  in a linear fashion and equals  / S , with 0 <  < 1. Thus
An increase in  implies the test is more accurate because the difference between stars and lemons in the probability of a favorable signal is a positive function of , and because
Let  equal the fraction of stars in the population. As will be seen, we must derive the probability a T1 has hired a star, given a favorable signal, prob(star|favorable), and the probability a T2 has hired a lemon, given an unfavorable signal, 1 The interview process is not modeled explicitly. For simplicity, it is assumed the signal is the same regardless of what type of school interviews an individual, and individuals are able to interview with both types of schools. 2 Athey et al. (2007) find first year micro and macro grades are "...statistically significant predictors of student job placement, even conditional on PhD completion." (p.512).
one receives a favorable signal. We have:
Since  has the same impact on prob(favorable|star) and prob(favorable|lemon), it cancels out when deriving prob(star|favorable). Note, Individuals are more likely to move from T1s to T2s than from T2s to T1s if T1s are more likely to hire lemons than T2 are to hire stars, or if: 1/x is not too large. Thus, it is quite plausible T1s make more "mistakes" than T2s do, so there is more movement from higher ranked schools down than there is from lower ranked schools up, as was found by Oyer (2008) .
3
To show  does not have to be small if  is not close to zero, consider the case when  > 0 and  = ½. If  = ½, prob(star|favorable) = , and
We have
Now  is maximized when x = 1 and  = 0. For x < 1,  < 0, so the larger is x (the smaller is  S / L ), the smaller is *, and it will be more likely stars will move up than lemons will move down. For example, using ineq. (5), if x = 1/3, * = ¾, and, if x = ½, have more downward movement than upward movement.
Conclusion
Oyer (2007, 2008) found economics professors are more likely to move down from higher ranked schools than up from lower ranked schools. In this paper, it was demonstrated an asymmetric information model with screening may explain the observed behavior of these professors. The smaller the fraction,, of more able individuals (stars) in the population, the more likely are higher ranked schools to hire less able individuals (lemons), and the less likely are lower ranked schools to hire more able individuals. Thus a lower  implies a greater likelihood professors will move down to lower ranked schools at a greater rate than they will move up from lower ranked schools.
A more accurate testing mechanism (d > 0) does not affect the probability of hiring a star given a favorable signal, but increases the probability of hiring a lemon given an unfavorable signal. If stars only receive a favorable signal ( = 1), no stars would be hired in lower ranked schools, so these schools would make no mistakes and have no one to move up, but some lemons would still receive a favorable signal and be hired at higher ranked schools. Thus, in the sense, the more accurate the test, the less likely are stars to get an unfavorable signal, we find a more accurate test increases the likelihood upward movement will be less frequent than movement in the opposite direction.
